T he reliable and confidential exchange of medical data is critical to making healthcare more efficient and cost-effective, while also protecting patient privacy. For this reason, healthcare providers are increasingly abandoning paper-based records in favor of electronic health records (EHRs) or electronic case records (ECRs). Laws recently enacted in many countries, such as the US Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, encourage the development and use of EHRs/ECRs.
Due to the federated nature of EHRs/ECRs, security, privacy, and patient informed consent are key objectives. However, the complexity of state-of-the-art security architectures can make their integration with healthcare provider IT systems prohibitively expensive. Consequently, EHR/ECR providers must strive for innovative, costeffective solutions.
In Germany, the Electronic Case Record Association-an interest group that includes major hospitals and clinics, local healthcare associations, and regional healthcare networks-has introduced a new deployment concept, ECR in a Box, that hides the security and priAn innovative deployment concept decouples document sources and electronic health records to provide an easy-to-use, seamless, yet secure platform for use in the cumbersome task of integrating an EHR platform into a regional healthcare network. As Figure 1 shows, the ECR architecture defines a distributed peer-to-peer platform without central services. Each healthcare provider participating in the circle of treatment acts as an ECR peer. This implies that each participant must independently implement all ECR-related services-authentication, authorization, data storage, and so on. These implementations are based on the ECR service stack specification, which defines ECR peer connections to the local infrastructure and to other peers.
This federated healthcare environment includes distinct services (implemented as Web services), the ECR registry, the ECR repository, and the ECR consumer, all of which are managed by an ECR provider-typically a hospital. To enable an integrated viewpoint, the ECR provider fulfills the role of both data source and mediator: it operates one or more peers that both store medical data and return request results from other peers. All peers within the medical circle of treatment are likewise equal partners in a technical "circle of trust."
SeCURITY ARChITeCTURe
Because security is a cross-cutting concern, the primary healthcare provider's ECR system incorporates a security architecture to ensure that only medical staff members with the patient's consent can access protected medical data. The security architecture's access control model combines discretionary access control (DAC), rolebased access control (RBAC), and policy-based access control (PBAC). A white paper published by the nonprofit Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) describes the underlying security principles in more detail. 1 The communication among different clients and services as well as between the ECR services themselves occurs via synchronous end-to-end message exchange (unicast) in layer 7 of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. The generic communication pattern between two ECR peers is as follows:
• The client sends a request message to an ECR service and then pauses until service execution.
• The ECR service processes the request and executes the appropriate operation.
• The result is returned to the client, which then resumes its activities.
To g u a r a n t e e m a x i m u m i n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y between the communicating ECR peers, the ECR architecture uses state-of-the-art standards for its messaging infrastructure-for example, SOAP and protocols such as WS-SecureConversation to establish security contexts across messages, 2 WS-Trust for trusted message exchange, 3 and WS-SecurityPolicy for the description of a service's security requirements. 4 The security architecture is completely independent of the application/business architecture. Security tokensspecifically, digitally signed SAML assertions 5 -are transferred solely in the SOAP security header, just as the WS-Security standard specifies, 6 even for proxy solutions deployed behind XML gateways. As Figure 2 shows, the ECR architecture applies several security mechanisms to protect medical data. This includes authentication and authorization at the service layer, and subsequently the pseudonymization of the stored data. Furthermore, each of the ECR services' related stored data is technically separated to prevent prohibited data aggregation, such as data mining and data fusion.
The security architecture relies on a completely decentralized processing paradigm that takes authentication for granted. Each peer uses an identity provider to authenticate healthcare professionals via X.509 certificates. Identity providers establish trust by issuing the identity assertions that a service consumer uses to demand access to service providers. In the ECR case, this identity assertion contains the authenticated healthcare professional's attributes that might be relevant for retrieving a patient's records. The client application subsequently passes the returned assertion and a patient identifier to a cryptographic service provider. This admission token service creates secret hashes for each healthcare professional attribute concatenated with a patient identifier.
In this peer-to-peer approach, the authentication assertion is forwarded to any other peer that calculates secret hashes as well. Admission codes are created for each peer and returned to the client application in a second SAML assertion-the admission assertion collection-that contains further admission assertions from each peer. This approach enables pseudonymization because the relationship between the healthcare professional and the patient is secret: a patient identifier is not needed when working on a case record.
A peer's registry service retrieves case records from both the local data store and the respective registry service of the trusted peers.
Each registry service returns those records that comply with the admission codes assigned to it. For a healthcare professional to browse a case record's contents, create folders, or request medical data, the service request must contain an authorization. Following the principle of using security tokens with separated concerns, a second authorization service must issue another SAML (named access assertion) by passing a selected case record identifier and an admission assertion to that authorization service. The access assertion has one or more assigned access policies that express the access rights that the ECR business services must enforce. The ECR provider must determine whether the assignment needs an explicit access policy. In such a case, either a client application (policy push) or an ECR business service (policy pull) might request an optional policy assertion with an XACML policy set and enforce it accordingly. 7 To guarantee confidentiality, each ECR peer's document repository encrypts all medical documents before the system transmits them to the client.
eCR IN A BOX
The above-described ECR platform provides interfaces for both outpatient and inpatient care. But to function properly in both domains, the underlying technical architecture must maintain interoperability between the office-based and hospital-based IT systems. Integration with primary healthcare IT systems is essential for the platform's overall acceptance, but this might be limited by high costs in terms of both time and money. Related concerns include the following:
• The implementation and deployment of state-of-theart security architectures is not a strong business area for most hospital IT vendors. Given the fact that hospitals with a long history of systems integration often deal with vendor lock-in, this could lead to conflicts. • The ECR's deployment of business and security services aims for a tight integration between the hospital information system (HIS) and its supporting clinical workflows. A "boxed" implementation of the ECR has been developed by Fraunhofer FOKUS to offer a highly integrated ECR solution that supports an easy integration into existing HISs and that encapsulates security aspects and issues. Accomplishing this requires a proprietary interface between the HIS and the ECR service stack-that is, vendors must provide customer-specific ECR solutions that individually integrate with HIS subsystems.
Integrating services
Because developing customer-specific ECR solutions can be difficult or even infeasible for some vendors, ECR in a Box addresses these concerns. The platform includes the following:
• ECR application services come preloaded with security services and privacy-enhancing technologies to hide complexity from both the provider (the hospital) and the client (the physician). Simple programming and webservice interfaces on the client side and a standardsbased retrieve, locate, and update service (RLUS) interface on the provider side are likewise predefined. Vendors can revert to original interfaces as needed. • As Figure 3 shows, ECR plugs are the glue between the RLUS interface and the HIS. Since HL7 v2 messages are predominantly used in hospitals, ECR plugs transform those messages into clinical document architecture (CDA) documents and vice versa. updated medical documents in the medical document management (HL7 v2 MDM) format; they encode all patient-related, administrative events (admit, transfer, discharge, and so on) in the admit discharge transfer (HL7 v2 ADT) format. ECR plugs are easy to implement with the communication servers that link HIS subsystems. Additionally, ECR in a Box provides ECR plugs for most common identity and access management systems as well as IHE cross-enterprise document sharing (XDS) systems.
ECR in a Box handles a case record's life-cycle management as well as its contents. The platform is loaded with special HL7 CDA documents that are used as controlling objects to create and update case records, thereby easing plug and play. In fact, ECR in a Box's innovation is that it handles file management through CDA documents. This approach is similar to the document engineering approach, in which the exchanged documents control the underlying business process. 9 This moves ECR life-cycle management from the HIS to the ECR platform.
A CDA content module is a template for a specific HL7 v3 CDA entity such as a document, section, or entry. The specified ECR modules are based on IHE PCC (patient care coordination) CDA content modules, in which CDA documents are profiled for their conformance to special templates. 10 Table 1 lists several CDA content modules specified for ECR in a Box.
We focus here on the two most widely used individual content modules-extracting and updating documents.
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ECR extract documents are used for two purposes and thus come in two variations:
• ECR providers use initial extract documents to create documents, such as the initial case record extract document, which they can send to ECR in a Box to set up a new ECR instance.
• Healthcare professionals use vital extract documents to query ECR in a Box for a given object's vital extract document, which the platform uses to process an ECR or a visit's current content or state.
ECR update documents update object properties of visits and case records. ECRs have two defined update content modules because consent and authorization updates require special handling as opposed to "generic" updates:
• Healthcare professionals use case record update content modules to update the case record itself, that is, to upload new documents such as diagnostic findings.
• Consent update content modules update patient informed consent. ECR in a Box directly infers access rights from these consent documents.
Information object or document metadata cannot be updated; if modifications are needed, the client simply sends a new document to ECR in a Box. Just as sent HL7 v3 CDA documents represent operation instructions ("initialize new case record," "read data," "put new data"), the exact inbound and outbound provider interface must be defined for the CDA's controlling documents. Consequently, ECR in a Box's server-side face must provide an interface for querying against the information models inside the box as well: case management and medical data are commonly governed by the HIS, not the ECR platform.
The inbound/outbound provider interface typically uses the following operations:
• initialize-send new information objects to ECR in a Box; Every operation has defined request and response messages that carry information to and from ECR in a Box. To initialize, maintain, and use the core structural objects found in case records, ECR in a Box accepts messages that comply with the RLUS service functional model specification.
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The ECR-specific inbound/outbound provider interface supports a core subset of the functionalities defined in the RLUS specification; specifically, ECR in a Box requires HL7 v3. Additional ECR plugs that convert messages in outdated formats might support older HL7 versions. Using HL7 messages to couple the ECR with the internal IT infrastructure requires mapping the internal record structure to the ECR structure. This is accomplished by means of semantic signifiers.
Semantic signifiers
Medical and administrative data transferred between ECR in a Box and ECR plugs must be described both semantically and structurally:
• For interoperability with RLUS services, a classification and description of the returned data must be available to enable its further processing.
• Requested data from ECR in a Box must be identifiable and transferable in an appropriate return type. The return type does not necessarily need to be the same as the storage type, but its requestors should have defined it. • Ideally, search requests and filters should not be aligned against generic metadata but rather against specific information models.
The RLUS specification provides a flexible means of querying data. So-called semantic signifiers specify the RLUS messages that ECR in a Box processes, defining the syntax and semantics of the data that is to be exchanged via the message: with semantic signifiers, a service provider can make statements about the message's content and structure that should be communicated, similar to a service description in WSDL documents. A semantic signifier's essential elements include its name, its description, and a normative data structure that describes instances of it-for example, implementation guidelines, schemas, and specifications for validation.
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As the term implies, a specific semantic signifier establishes a specific view on the stored ECR data in an ECR data back end. The "filling" of a semantic signifier-its instantiation-with medical data relates to the system's ability to interpret the data. Generally, two types of systems identify the extent to which an RLUS implementation can interpret medical data:
• A content agnostic implementation cannot interpret the data. This is analogous to an IHE XDS.b document repository, in which a document from an inquiring system-say, an XDS.b document consumer-is retrieved solely by using a document identifier. A system behaves similarly when the data is encrypted and must be decrypted by a third party. To allow a search on such data (content independent), metadata must be associated with it.
• In contrast, content-aware systems can interpret or analyze a database. These systems are characterized by data that is collectable and transferable into a return type defined by a semantic signifier. In other words, complex queries for specific data are possible. Data warehouse systems with data mining and online analytical processing have this capability. Medical ontologies might also be used.
Although ECR in a Box currently processes a handful of information types-see the ECR content modules in Table 1 -future implementations should be able to return aggregated data.
Off-the-shelf deployment
ECR in a Box provides a logical combination of technical components that can be used for both software and hardware implementations. For example, Fraunhofer FOKUS implements the ECR in a Box concepts using an XML gateway to offer
• service virtualization, • dataflow control, • event and access attempt auditing, • integrity verification and confidentiality enforcement on exchanged data, and • integrated hardware modules.
Going forward, additional ECR implementation could be virtualized using XML gateways, such as the ECR application architecture or metadata management.
ECR in a Box provides a highly integrated software or hardware solution that supports easy integration into existing HISs and encapsulates security features.
The client-side counterpart of ECR in a Box is the ECR connector. Just as ECR in a Box facilitates the integration of HIS subsystems, the ECR connector simplifies the connection of client-side systems. As Figure 4 shows, the ECR Connector implements various webservice security mechanisms defined by ECR specifications, transparently setting up secure ECR in a Box sessions via WS-SecureConversation and handling all security tokens such as authentication and authorization for service invocations. It is not necessary for a physician's desktop system to process ECR security-related tokens because the ECR connector encapsulates that task.
The ECR connector can be used both as a software library and as a hardware box with a SOAP interface. Other approaches for using the ECR connector incorporate a Web-distributed authoring and versioning (WebDAV) interface or printer drivers with text recognition. For example, HL7 CDA referral letters might be used as an active control object to create a new case record. Additionally, to register the document, the physician's desktop system can upload it into special WebDAV folders or it can print them via a virtual printer, which might be necessary if the primary HIS does not support direct document export.
A COMPARISON
The ECR is primarily a German construct for which there is no comparable system in most countries. The ECR platform is dedicated to regional health networks with the purpose of better treatment for patients receiving care from various healthcare providers. In Germany, information exchange among health information organizations is subject to regulation and very restricted. Thus, the case record has a dedicated use and a limited set of users. From the data protection perspective, the ECR concept is widely accepted because no queries on stored data reveal the entirety of a patient's data. Only a limited set of users who have received consent can retrieve case records. This separates the ECR from other sharable EHR approaches, such as those used in the US or other countries in Europe.
In the US, the Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN), now called eHealth Exchange, created a specification for a messaging platform that allows health-related information exchange. The NHIN and ECRs share the same architectural principles, such as decentralization, local autonomy, and service orientation. Both specifications also rely exclusively on open standards. Table 2 highlights other similarities and differences. C urrently, ECR in a Box has proved to be valuable on the ECR provider side, but future work will focus on enabling physicians on the client side to make semantic queries via the ECR connector. This will increase the quality of communicated data and demonstrate the advantages of using a content-aware system at the document level.
Other work also must be done on secure rendering of case records when using mobile devices, which is becoming increasingly more common in the medical field. Fraunhofer FOKUS is likewise investigating emerging Web security trends such as JSON data structures 14 and associated JSON security profiles (addressing signatures and encryption) and their suitability for the ECR security architecture. Thus, JSON simplifies and enables the usage of mobile devices and establishes a second, secured communication protocol next to SOAP.
